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2Democracy promotion as part of U.S. foreign policy has gotten a bad rap recently.  In fact, 
the various U.S. government agencies in charge of democracy promotion now hide behind the 
term “Enhancing Democracy.”  Not too long ago, intellectuals debated and celebrated the “End 
of History” thesis—the end culminating in the victory of democracy.  Now, as democracy 
promoting NGO Freedom House recently reported, the very essence of democracy—freedom—
is in retreat everywhere.1
Despite the setbacks in democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
democracy as a desired political system has not lost its appeal, as it was readily evident from the 
streets of Teheran in 2009, in Yangon in 2007, in Beirut in 2005, and in Kiev in 2004.  Those 
young and old who risked their lives came out to chant “Freedom”, “Democracy”, and 
“Sovereignty”—not unlike those young and old South Koreans who came out in force to demand 
democracy, freedom, and better governance in the 1980s.  
Winston Churchill once sardonically described democracy as being the worst form of 
government except all others that have been tried.  Yet, the wave of democracy that engulfed the 
twilight of the previous century is one of the most salient political developments of the twentieth 
century.  As a political system and ideology, Amartya Sen notes that theorists no longer frame 
the debate around the question whether a country is deemed “fit” for democracy; “rather, it has 
to become fit through democracy.”2  The importance of democracy is not lost among the 
academics.  Almost 70 percent of all articles published in the leading journals dedicated to 
                                                
1 Arch Puddington, “Freedom in Retreat: Is the Tide Turning?” Freedom in the World 2008 (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield),  3-14.
2 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (July 1993): 3-17.
3comparative politics focuses on some aspect of democratization and democratic institutions.3  
Despite the recent appearance of retreat in democracy, the yearning for democracy and its related 
concept of good governance have not waned.  
South Korea succeeded in 1987 in making the democratic transition from authoritarian 
rule.  However, 1987 was neither a starting point nor an endpoint for South Korea’s road to 
democracy.  The four decades preceding the 1987 presidential election witnessed countless 
cycles of democratic protests followed by immediate government repression.  Two decades later, 
South Korea’s democratic consolidation continues.
What is interesting about the South Korean case of democratization is that South Korea 
fits into just about every category of debate regarding political and economic development.  
Therefore, the Korean case is often used to test the hypotheses regarding democratic transition 
and democratic consolidation.  What is the relationship between economic development and 
democracy?  Can it be crafted?   Or does democracy require a certain level of economic 
development and other pre-conditions?  What leads to democracy?  Is it having a vibrant civil 
society?   The bottom-up, grassroots approach to democracy.  Or is it an elite pact?  The top-
down approach to democracy.  How does one measure and define democracy?  And so on.
That the Korean test case validates each of the aforementioned theoretical questions is 
both a validation of how complex political-economic development is and how unsatisfying 
existing theories are when it comes to explaining democratization.  Therefore, this paper will 
examine a) the relationship between economic development and democracy, b) Korea’s 
democratization process, and c) factors that lead to Korea’s democratic transition and 
                                                
3 Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, “Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading 
Journals,” Comparative Political Studies  40, no. 1 (January 2007): 5-31.  The three journals are Comparative 
Political Studies, Comparative Politics, and World Politics; authors examined articles from 1989-2004.  See Table 1 
on page 9.
4consolidation in a comparative perspective.  In so doing, this paper will argue that rather than 
seeking a coherent, unified theory of democratization, social scientists should identify underlying 
dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation with the hope of mapping out alternative 
ways to explain processes of democratization.
Economic Development and Democracy
The major debate is: what is the relationship between democracy and economic 
development?  This debate examines the conflict between the proponents of the endogenous 
theory and the exogenous theory.  The endogenous theory states that democracy is a function of 
economic development; as poorer countries develop, the likelihood for a democratic transition 
also increases.  The exogenous theory argues that while economic development sustains the 
longevity of a democracy, the transition to democracy from authoritarian rule is exogenous to 
development, that is say that development does not cause democracy.  What this paper is not
about is how Korea grew economically.4   
                                                
4 For a general discussion on Korea’s development, see Cho Soon, The Dynamics of Korean Economic 
Development (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); Il Sakong, Korea in the World 
Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993); and Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the 
Korean Economy (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990).  For a discussion on outward-oriented liberal trade 
policies, see Robert Z. Lawrence and David E. Weinstein, “Trade and Growth: Import-Led or Export-Led?  
Evidence from Japan and Korea,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7264, (July 1999); Jeffrey 
A. Frankel, David Romer, and Teresa Cyrus, “Trade and Growth in East Asian Countries: Cause and Effect?” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5732, (August 1996); and Jose Duran, Nanno Mulder, and 
Osamu Onodera, “Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: Latin America Versus East Asia 1970-2006,”
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No. 70 (2008). For a discussion on the role of government interventions, see 
Chung H. Lee, “The government, Financial System, and Large Private Enterprises in the Economic Development of 
South Korea,” World Development  20, no. 2 (1992): 187-197; Dani Rodrik, “Getting Interventions Right: How 
South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 4964, ( December 
1994); and Yoon Je Cho, “Government Intervention, Rent Distribution, and Economic Development in Korea,” in 
Masahiko Aoki, et . al (ed) The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).  For a discussion on the interplay between the state and business, see Eun Mee Kim, Big 
Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1997) and Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: 
5The endogenous theory posits that democracy emerges as a function of economic 
development.  Lipset observed five decades ago that “the most common generalization linking 
political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of 
economic development.”5  As states become industrialized, the society undergoes a highly 
specialized and complex transformation.  Urbanization takes place, and this requires a more 
sophisticated government to both control and provide for the citizenry.   In a traditional society, 
the state’s penetration into the masses was rare, largely limited to tax collection or conscription 
to fight a war.  In a newly industrializing and urbanizing state, the government’s interaction with 
the masses was pervasive and frequent.  Governments had to provide for large construction 
projects such as railways, roads, public utility, and other public goods.  The state had to embark 
on massive education programs to educate the children of the factory workers and urban dwellers 
who would later grow up to administer the complexities of an industrializing society.   The state 
saw through education the creation of a modern citizen who would not only contribute to the 
economic growth but also become more compliant to the needs of the state: obeying laws, paying 
taxes, etc.6  Through the massive educational programs, successive generations’ level of literacy 
would rise.  This rise in literacy rate would correspond with the flourishing of the press—
newspapers, journals, weeklies, and more.7  The increased level to media exposure would lead to 
increasing participation in politics by the citizenry in all arenas—political, civil, and economic.  
Thus, a society—a civil society—emerges that, once reaching a threshold, could and would 
                                                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press, 1989).  For a discussion on the role of foreign aid, see Anne O. Krueger, The 
Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
5 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963): 31.
6 See James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
7 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).
6question and then challenge what the rulers do.  This narrative is in a nutshell the modernization 
theory. 8
Deduced from this logic/narrative is the view that this process ultimately leads to the 
democratization of the state.  Some critics of modernization theories have attacked the basics of 
the theory and its variations for being overly deterministic, too Western-centric, too linear in 
transformation, and seeing democracy as the endpoint.9  Others have criticized it for being overly 
structural and abstract, lacking precision in causal changes and the agents behind the effective 
changes.10  
The most serious challenge to the endogenous component of the modernization theory is 
the exogenous argument put forth by Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi over a decade 
ago.  In their seminal 1997 World Politics article “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, 
Przeworski and Limongi challenge the endogenous claims by arguing that “dictatorships are 
equally likely to die and democracies to emerge at any level of development.”11  The authors 
provide empirical evidence to show that there is no causal relationship between development and 
transition to democracy.   Moreover, once a democracy is established in a well-to-do economy, 
“the probability that a democracy will die during any particular year in a country with an income 
above $4,000 is practically zero: two in a thousand years.”12  This is the exogenous argument of 
the modernization theory.  The high correlation between democracy and wealthy nations is due 
                                                
8 See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 
1958); 
9 See Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): pp. 7-25.
10 See Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Ruth Berins 
Collier, Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, World Politics49, no. 2 (1997),  
158. 
12 Ibid., 166.
7to the sustaining role that development has on democracy.  For the authors, the emergence of 
democracy is really deus ex machina.
Given the emergence of democracies recently and historically under the conditions of 
economic growth, is there really no causal relationship between democracy and development?  
Can decades of research on the impact of economic development on political development be 
negated?   Challenging Przeworski and Limongi are Carles Boix and Susan Stokes writing in the 
same journal.  Boix and Stokes contend that “economic development has a strong effect on 
democratization.”13  The authors challenge Przeworski and Limongi by enlarging the sample size 
to includes cases from mid-nineteenth century on as opposed to post-1950 cases used by 
Przeworski and Limongi.  The larger case sample shows that earlier democratizations in Western 
Europe had strong endogenous effect.14
The Korean Case
Where does Korea fit into this debate?  How does democracy emerge in South Korea in 
the late 1980s?  What does the Korean democratization process tell us about democratic 
transition and consolidation?  Samuel Huntington put it forcefully, “Economic development 
makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real.”15  Thus far, the body of literature 
discussed centers on the necessary structural condition but not a causal one.  Because 
democratization is about a process that involves actors and coalitions in conflict with one another, 
any kind of theory trying to explain for democratization must take into account the role of agents, 
                                                
13 Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics55, no. 4 (July 2003), 519.
14 Ibid.
15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratizaton in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
8how their demands are articulated, how they overcome oppression, and how they overcome 
collective action problems. 
At its most rudimentary form, non-democratic rulers are compelled to make some kind of 
democratic reforms that allow the sharing of power or allow the masses to have a direct say in 
the power sharing and formation.  This process begins usually with an opening that makes 
democratic transition possible.  The simple question then is to ask: who demands democracy and 
how does this opening come about?
There are three broad categories of explanations for Korea’s democratization in the 1980s.  
The first is that the political elites, under social and economic duress, come into a political pact 
that pave the way for a direct presidential election in 1987.  The second explanation is the civil 
society argument.  A vibrant civil society had emerged by the mid-1980s, and that this civil 
society compels the elites to yield to the demands of the various actors in a coalition that called 
for democracy.  The third argument is a descriptive one in which both chance and foreign 
influence played the critical role in the democratic transition.
The Backdrop
In April 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan who had come into power through a military 
coup at the end of 1979 announced that there would be no discussion of constitutional changes 
until after the hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics and that his successor would be chosen via 
an electoral college that was constitutionally rigged by his supporters.  This announcement 
already fueled the spreading of student demonstrations throughout Korea.  University students 
9joined labor protests and labor unions joined forces with the student protests demanding direct 
presidential election.  Hoping to catch not only domestic attention but also international attention 
as Korea prepared to host the 1988 Summer Olympics, coalitions of groups bannered together to 
carry out large-scale protests throughout the country.  Their plan worked.  
What started out as pockets of student-led demonstrations turned out to be a tidal wave of 
mass demonstrations, supported by every sector of society.   Resembling the Philippines’ People 
Power movement the year before, the mass demonstrations confronted the government with two 
stark choices: clamp down on the demonstrators using excessive violence or give in to the 
people’s demands.  In a surprise but shrewd move, the ruling party presidential candidate Roh 
Tae Woo made his famous June 29 declaration calling for a direct national election and a 
revision of the constitution.16  Roh Tae Woo wins the presidency in a three-way race, when 
opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung fail to field a unified candidate.  When 
Roh is inaugurated in February 1988, Korea’s democratic transition is complete.
For the purpose of analysis, the definition of democracy used here is the institutional or a 
procedural definition of democracy, what theorists of democracy have called the minimalist view 
of democracy.  Joseph A. Schumpeter defines democracy as “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”17  Schumpeter argues that his definition provides an 
“efficient criterion by which to distinguish democratic governments from others”18 and captures 
the principle of democracy, “that the reins of government should be handed to those who 
                                                
16 See Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds., Political Change in South Korea (New York: The Korean PWPA, 
Inc., 1988) and James Cotton, ed., Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean 
Relations (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993).
17 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1950), 269.
18 Ibid.
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command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams.”19  Using the 
minimalist definition better suits the identification of actors and the opening in which the 
transition occurred.
Elite Pact
Elite pacts are agreements by political elites that make transition to democracy happen.  
Hyug Baeg Im argues: “The South Korean transition emerged out of a protracted and 
inconclusive standoff between the authoritarian regime and its democratic opponents.  The 
authoritarian regime and democratic opposition made a breakthrough for democratic transition 
on the brink of ‘reciprocal destruction.’”20  The events of 1987 are seen through this narrative of 
political elites coming together based on a narrow set of political calculations:  Chun Doo Hwan 
making the April 13 statement to ensure his rule through the 1988 Seoul Olympics, opposition 
leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung mobilizing massive opposition, and Roh Tae Woo 
conceding to the demands.  
What this narrative does is raise countless questions.  Why did this pact happen when it 
did?  Did the ruling elites fear uncontrollable widespread protests?  To be sure, there had been 
other massive protests in 1960, 1980, and 1986.  Why didn’t the state crack down?  Did it not 
have the capacity or the will?  Why was 1987 different from the past?  What impact did 
economic development have on Korea’s political and social landscape?
                                                
19 Ibid., 273.  Schumpter argues that his “another theory” of democracy takes out the normative value in democracy 
by shifting the emphasis away from the classical definition of democracy that favors direct participation of the 
citizens in the act of governance because a modern nation-state is simply too large and complicated for each 
individual to have a direct say in the daily political decision making.
20 Hyung Baeg Im, “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective,” in Consolidating 
Democracy in South Korea, Larry Diamond and Yung-Kook Kim, eds., (Boulder, CO; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000), 25.
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The explanations that focus on elite calculations alone cannot explain the context for their 
decisions.  The Korea of 1987 was very different from the Korea of the 1950s.  Rapid 
urbanization of the first half of the 20th century continued after the Korea War.  Cities with over 
one million inhabitants grew from 40% in 1960 to 55.9% in 1987.21  The per capita GNP in 1960 
was $80, roughly the same as Ghana and Sudan.22  By 1988, the per capita income of Korean 
citizens is $3,120.23  Similarly, education level also increased dramatically.  In 1946, the share of 
work force with secondary school education was 7.4%; in 1983, this figure was almost 50%.24
Korea’s urbanization, increase in education, and rising income positively correlate with the 
central tenets of modernization theory.  As such, the structure that constrains elite decision 
making in Korea in 1987 could have evolved over the preceding decades.  Moreover, just 
because an elite pact provided an opening for democratic transition does not necessarily mean 
that it caused it.25
Role of Civil Society
Another explanation for the Korean democratic transition is the role civil society played.  
Civil society is broadly defined as that area “beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan 
and beyond the locality; it lies short of the state.”26  Larry Diamond contrasts “civil society” 
from “society” in general in that “it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to 
express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make 
                                                
21 Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, p.21.
22 Mark L. Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureacrats, and Generals in South Korea (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1998): 9.
23 Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, p.35.
24 Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrializatio, p. 222.
25 Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000): 4.
26
Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” Government and Opposition 26, no. 1 (1991): 3.
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demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable (italics original).”27  In short, a vibrant 
civil society can aggregate the interests of the public and challenge the state.  
Sunhyuk Kim argues that Korea’s civil society is the most crucial variable in explaining 
Korea’s democratization because “groups in civil society significantly precipitated—if not 
directly caused—authoritarian breakdowns, facilitated democratic transitions, and, to large extent, 
also determined the dynamics of posttransitional politics in democratic consolidation.”28  Kim 
argues that there are three democratic junctures: 1956-1961, 1973-1980, and 1984-1987.29  At 
each of the junctures, civil society played a critical role; and in the third juncture, civil society 
played the most influential role.  The role of civil society would answer the question of how and 
when an “opening” emerges.
The problem, however, with the civil society thesis is one of measurement.  How large 
and active was the civil society when it intruded into the state’s behavior to constrain it or 
modify its behavior?   Because we firmly believe in active participation of the individual in a 
democracy beyond the periodic voting, civil society proponents inflate the causal role of civil 
society.  The explanation is too often historical and descriptive, as leaders’ names and groups are 
thrown together to suggest that they represent either the totality of civil society or that these 
groups have large memberships to effect change.
The reality of Korean civil society, especially at the time of 1987 events, is that the civil 
society reflected the political society; that is to say, the civil society was an elite-based society 
that at times could mobilize a large number of people.  Because the locus of civil society is in the 
masses, a civil society explanation should show a wide level of citizen participation.  According 
                                                
27 Larry Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 5.
28 Ibid., 5.
29 See Figure 2.3 in Kim’s The Politics of Democratization in Korea, p. 18.
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to Doh C. Shin, when it comes to political acts beyond voting (94%), Korean citizens had 
participated in double digits only in three of the nine activities.30
Percentages Engaging in Ten Political Activities31
Voting 94
Campaigning 10
Contributions 3
Attending Political Meetings 18
Joining Political Organizations 1
Communal Activity 12
Contacting Government Officials 2
Petition 14
Demonstration 9
Strike 3
Source: 1994 Korean Democratization Survey
Shin’s findings were based on a questionnaire that asked Korean citizens their 
participation rate from 1988-1994.  It is conceivable that acts like demonstrations and strikes 
were much higher in the period prior to 1988.  However, Jae H. Ku’s findings closely resemble 
Shin’s figures, albeit his findings are based on a Seoul metropolitan sample of 300.32  Ku’s 
questionnaire did not have any date stipulations.  For example, 19% of the Seoul sample had 
signed a petition which approximates the national figure of 14% reported by Shin.  
Antigovernment demonstration (8.7%)/lawful demonstration (8%) match up with the 1994 
Democratization Survey’s demonstration figure of 9%.   Furthermore, the Democratization 
Survey shows a 3% participation rate in strikes whereas the survey of Seoul is 1.7%.  Only 
                                                
30 Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 
102. 
31 Ibid., 102.  See Figure4.4.  
32 Jae H. Ku, Participation, Culture and Regionalism: Korea’s Process of Democratic Consolidation, a Ph.D. 
dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2002.
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attending political meetings is substantially different.  The 1994 Korean Democratization Survey 
shows an 18% participation rate whereas only 5.9% of Seoul residents have attended a political 
rally.  Every political activity, other than signing a petition, registers less than ten percent among 
Seoul’s adult population.  
Percentages of Seoul Residents in Non-electoral Forms of Political Participation33
Source: SAIS Survey 2000
N=300; 5.7% error
Number of cases: Antigovt. Demonstration (26), Strikes (5), Lawful Demonstration (24), Political Rally (18), 
Letter/Call (22), and Petition (58).
The empirical evidence suggests that, while civil society is an important variable, it is not 
altogether certain how critical it is in the transition phase.  Is it a necessary condition?  Is it the 
causal variable?  What is the proper relationship between those in the political society who 
agreed to the transition and those in the civil society who may have created the condition for the 
elite pact?  Perhaps, a different approach is needed that takes into consideration both spheres.
The impact of civil society may have a more acute influence in the democratic 
consolidation process of Korea.34  Juan Linz and Afred Stepan define democratic consolidation 
                                                
33 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
34 See Sunhyuk Kim, “Chapter 6: Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation, 1988-Present,” The Politics of 
Democratization in Korea, pp. 105-136.
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as a “political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become ‘the only game in town.’”35  
Previously, democracy was defined as an institutional arrangement for contesting votes.  The 
emphasis placed on electoral contestation, however, has been criticized as “fallacy of 
electoralism”36 because some democracies, while adhering to the “letter” of these institutions, 
were not following the “spirit” of these requirements. Robert A. Dahl builds on this shortcoming
by delineating institutional guarantees required in a democratic system.  For Dahl, a democracy 
is a political system in which the government is “completely or almost completely responsive to 
all its citizens.”37  For this to occur, citizens must be able to formulate their preferences, signify 
their preferences, and have their preferences weighed equally by the government.38  As a result, 
theorists added to this list of institutional guarantees.  Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 
argue that the “polity must be self-governing” and that the popularly elected officials must 
exercise their constitutionally entrusted power without being overridden by un-elected officials,39
what Larry Diamond has called “the absence of ‘reserved domains’ of power”.40  These reserved 
domains have largely been confined to the military and the security apparatus, although they are 
not the only ones.
Liberal democracy differs from an electoral democracy in that in addition to Dahl’s 
institutional guarantees, a liberal democracy requires both the absence of “reserved domains” 
                                                
35 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.
36 Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 13 (1996): 22.
37 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2.
38 Ibid., 2-3.  Dahl stakes out eight institutional: freedom to form and join organization, freedom of expression, right 
to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of 
information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference.
39 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is . . .  And Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2,  no. 
3 (1991): 81.
40 Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” 21.
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and the existence of “horizontal accountability”.41   Horizontal accountability refers to a system 
of checks and balances where the state agencies “are authorized and willing to oversee, control, 
redress, and if need be sanction unlawful actions by other state agencies.”42  
The argument is that consolidation of democracy will be strengthened if the citizens also 
engage in civil society activities.  If citizen activity in civil society is substantial quantitatively 
and qualitatively, democracy will be strengthened because citizen interests can be aggregated, 
their interests will be articulated, and the collective action problems associated with putting forth 
their interests will be overcome.  Such grassroots pressure would thereby lead to the 
government’s addressing the demands and concerns of the citizens—hence, horizontal 
accountability.
Role of the United States
The third explanation is the role of the United States.  The narrative suggests that 
in the events leading up to the 1987 transition, U.S. government officials repeatedly sent clear 
and strong signals opposing violent repression by the Korean military, thereby constraining and 
limiting the choices of the government elite and paving the way for a democratic transition.43
The problem with this argument is the problem of identifying the proper agents and the 
structure.  Given the classified nature of U.S. documents, it is unclear what kind of 
communication existed between the two governments.  Even if the U.S. had communicated 
                                                
41 Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?”, 23.  See the nine requirements of a liberal democracy in pp. 23-24.
42 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability In New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (July 
1988): 119.  
43 See James Fowler, “The United States and South Korean Democratization,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 
(Summer, 1999), pp. 265-288.  A more limited claim is made by William Stueck, “Democratization in Korea: The 
United States Role, 1980 and 1987” International Journal of Korean Studies 2, no. 1(Fall/Winter, 1998), pp. 1-26.
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strongly against violent repression and called for democratic reforms, there exists a threshold 
problem.  Did the Korean government feel the pressure?  Was this pressure more than the 
pressure emerging domestically?  Finally, how was the final outcome influenced by the U.S.?  A 
noted scholar suggests that “the American role in South Korea’s democratization was at best 
secondary.”44
Comparing Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines
In the sections above, this paper argued that modernization creates the structure necessary 
for democratic transition and consolidation.  Citizens become educated, urban, and literate about 
the political events of our time.  In short, they become democratic participants.  By participating, 
they demand democracy and create an opening in which democratic transition and/or 
consolidation can be made.
How do four democracies of the third wave in Asia compare?  The section below 
examines the participation level of urban citizens in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines.  The data come from SAIS Survey 2000.45  The four cases are interesting because 
they belong to the third wave category of democracy, have different levels of development, and 
                                                
44 William Stueck, “Democratization in Korea: The United States Role, 1980 and 1987” International Journal of 
Korean Studies 2, no. 1(Fall/Winter, 1998), pp. 19.
45
The SAIS-Yonsei Survey for Seoul and SAIS Survey for Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines: surveyed three 
hundred (N=300) randomly selected citizens in each of the capital cities of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
The sampling error for each individual sample is plus-minus 5.7 percent on a confidence level of 95 percent.  The 
sampling framework employed was stratified random sampling with quota considerations given to age and gender 
(male: 65%, female: 35%).  The interviews were conducted face-to-face, each interview lasting 1.0-1.5 hours.  The 
target population was those who are aged between 21 and 54, had not participated in any survey in the six months 
prior to this survey, and reside in metropolitan Seoul, Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila.  The surveys were conducted in 
March-April 2000 by the marketing firm of A.C.Nielsen in each of the respective capitals.
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are at different levels of democratic consolidation.  Two dimensions of participation are 
analyzed: voting and non-electoral participation.
Voting
All four capitals show a high rate of voting.  Figure 1 presents the distribution of 
frequency of voters in each of the four capitals.46   The Manila respondents are the most frequent 
voters; over 77 percent of the respondents voted in the two previous elections, whereas the same 
Figure 1.  Voter Frequency in Seoul, Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.
Source: SAIS-Yonsei Survey for Seoul, SAIS Surveys of Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.
N=300 (Indonesia N=310); 5.7 % error
The total may not add up to the total N due to missing values.
                                                
46 A high voter is someone who has voted in the two consecutive national elections, either in presidential or 
parliamentary elections, whereas the low voter is someone who voted only once or in neither of the two previous 
presidential or parliamentary elections
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figure for the respondents from the other three capitals is in the low to mid-60s.  As for the low 
voters, all four capital samples show this figure to be slightly over 20 percent.  In each of the 
four capitals, over eighty percent of the respondents have voted in either of the two most recent 
presidential or parliamentary elections or in both.  Indeed, this is a positive sign for democracy.
What is the socioeconomic background of these frequent voters?  See Appendix 1 for a 
binary logistic regression of the variables: gender, age, education level, mass media exposure, 
and monthly income.    The findings show that gender plays no statistically significant role in 
Seoul, Bangkok, and Jakarta; men and women tend to vote just as frequently.  Only in Manila is 
gender a significant factor.  Manila men vote slightly less frequently than women.47  In Seoul and 
Bangkok, older voters tend to vote more frequently, which is consistent with voting literature in 
advanced democracies.  However, in Jakarta and Manila, age does not affect the frequency of 
voting.  What is most interesting is that factors that should influence voting, according to 
modernization theory, do not have any influence.  These factors are education, media exposure, 
and income.  It is expected that individuals who are more educated and have higher income 
should vote in higher levels.  In Asia, the high voter turnout in all groups suggest that voting is 
internalized as an integral democratic act or has become a democratic ritual devoid of democratic 
affect.  
Non-electoral Participation
In all vibrant democracies, political participation must extend beyond the periodic voting.  
Only through regular acts of political participation will the elected leaders continue to be held 
                                                
47The actual cases show that among men, only 74 percent belong in the high category in Manila whereas 82 percent 
of women belong in the high category.  
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accountable.  How do the individuals from the four capitals measure up on non-electoral 
participation (NEP)?  To measure the level of non-electoral participation, an NEP index was 
created, based on five areas of non-electoral forms of political participation.  The index is based 
on the respondents’ answers to whether they have participated or would contemplate future 
participation in five areas of non-electoral forms of political activities: writing a letter to a 
newspaper or calling a radio or a television show, signing a petition, attending a lawful 
demonstration, participating in an election rally or a meeting, and joining unofficial strikes.48  A 
separate index of high, medium, and low categories was created for each of the capital sample.49  
Therefore, high, medium, and low categories are not uniformly based.  For example, a high 
participant in Seoul and Jakarta may not have the same score; however, each score reflects the 
degree of participation relative to others that are drawn from the same representative sample.  
This should not detract from cross-capital comparison because the indexes are roughly 
comparable in all four capital samples.   In other words, the categories of participants across the 
capital samples share similar characteristics that allow cross-national comparison.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the frequency distribution of high, medium, and low 
participants across the four Asian capitals.  Across the four Asian capitals, it is clearly evident 
that non-electoral participation is very low.  Only the Seoul sample shows a high participant 
category that exceeds ten percent.  Bangkok and Manila samples show a high participant rate to 
be eight percent, while this figure is three percent in Jakarta.  The vast majority of respondents in 
each of the four capital samples belong in the low category of participation.  Some 75 to 80 
percent of the respondents in Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok belong in the low category of 
                                                
48 The answers allowed were “have done”, “might do”, and “never”.  A “never” answer was given a score of one, 
“might do” a score of three, and “have done” a score of five.  The scores were then added to form an index.
49 Hereafter, those individuals scoring in the three categories will be simply labeled as high, medium, and low 
participants.
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participation; this figure is slightly less for Seoul at 63 percent.   Even if one were to combine the 
high and medium categories, only about a quarter of the respondents from Manila, Jakarta, and 
Bangkok would belong in this category; the figure for Seoul would be a little more than a third of 
Figure 2.  Non-electoral Participation Index for Seoul, Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.
Source: SAIS-Yonsei Survey for Seoul, SAIS Surveys of Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.
N=300 (Indonesia N=310); 5.7 % error
The total may not add up to 100% due to missing values.
the respondents.  Despite the similarity in all four cities regarding low participation level, there is 
a noticeable variation in these capitals among those who actually do participate, with Seoul at the 
top end of participation and Jakarta at the bottom of participation.  
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Which socioeconomic factors characterize the high, medium, and low participants?  See 
Appendix 2 for regression analysis of the variables: gender, age, education level, mass media 
exposure, and monthly income.   In all four capital samples, gender, media exposure, and income 
have little or no bearing on non-electoral forms of political participation.  Men and women are 
equally likely to be participants.  In Seoul and Bangkok, age is not a statistically significant 
factor.  However, in Manila and in Jakarta, age is negatively correlated with participation.  It is
the 20-29 year olds who engage heavily in non-electoral forms of participation.  Only in Seoul 
does education matter.  Only those with high levels of education tend to participate in non-
electoral forms of education.  This finding collaborates the role of the university students in the 
democratization process.  What these empirical findings show is that modernization does not 
lead to a repeatable pattern.  In fact, there is a certain disconnect between modernization and 
democracy in Asia.
Conclusion: A Unified Theory or an Eclectic Approach?
The above examination has assessed both the strengths and shortcomings of both 
exogenous and endogenous theory of democracy.   The exogenous theory is parsimonious and 
empirically sound, albeit if the cases are limited to the second half of 20th century.  What makes 
it dissatisfying is that democratization occurs and transitions are successfully made, yet this 
theory says very little about how democracies emerge.  On the other hand, the endogenous 
claims are messy and confusing.  Much of the argument is about refining modernization theory 
to create a structural condition in which actors and coalitions can mount a real challenge to the 
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state that forces democratic transition.  While rich in description, the difficulty arises in finding a 
parsimonious explanation linking structure with agents.
Where do we go from here?  Recent studies have called for a unified approach, an 
approach that explains not only the democratic transitions but also the typologies of transition.  
Carl Boix in Democracy and Redistribution50 and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in 
Economic origins of Dictatorship and Democracy51 posit a game theoretic approach to explain 
democratic transitions.  Boix’s argument boils down to inequality and asset specificity.  As 
income inequality narrows between the rulers and the ruled and the mobility of capital increases, 
“economic tensions decline, and the rich are increasingly inclined to accept a democratic 
regime—elections have only a marginal impact on the wealthy’s consumption level.”52  The 
rulers feel less threatened and, therefore, can entertain the idea of democratic reforms.  In a more 
complex treatment of collective decision making and the role institutions play, Daron Acemoglu 
and James A. Robinson argue that democracy is about individuals making informed decisions, 
always calculating and rational but always in conflict.  That the ruling elites will agree to 
concede to some level of democratization is out of fear of revolt by the masses that would lead to 
their ruin; this fear leads to concessions by the rulers who show commitment to promises made 
to the masses in the form of democratic transitions and rule.
There are limitations to economic-based explanations or rational calculations.  In the 
Korean case, the emphasis on redistributive demands can perhaps explain for the labor protests.  
But does this also explain the student unrest?  Did the tens of thousands of university students, 
largely from middle class background, share the labor demands for redistribution of assets?  
                                                
50 Carl Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
51 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in Economic origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
52 Carl Boix, Democracy and Redistribution, pp. 37.
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Perhaps.  But where does socialization, passion, ideology, and kinship fit into an economic-based 
calculations.  What if significant portions of Asians participated and protested because of 
familial, moral, patron-client obligations?
If rational-choice theories are not universally applicable, should the study of 
democratization continue to seek a unified theory or should it accept the view that there are many 
different paths to democracy?  Samuel Huntington in his The Third Wave suggests that there are 
many causal factors in the dynamics of democratization and that social environment must be 
analyzed.  
If democracy is necessarily about collective action of individuals staking out a political 
claim, the study of democracy should be about citizen participation.  Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady argue that “Citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. . .[because] political 
participation provides the mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about 
their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond.”53  Perhaps, the best 
approach is an eclectic one that centers on the factors that promote and inhibit citizen 
participation.  No participation, no democracy.
                                                
53 Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American 
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1.
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Appendix 1.
Logistic Regression Analysis of High Voters in Seoul, Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta
High Voter
(Low Voter)
Seoul Bangkok Manila Jakarta
Ex(B) Ex(B) Ex(B) Ex(B)
Gender
Male 
(Female)
.290 .227 -.745** .475 -.321
Age
40 to 54 .814** 2.257 2.265*** 9.627 .812* 2.252 .011
30 to 39
(20 to 29)
.959*** 2.609 1.436*** 4.204 .242 .574
Education
High -.288 .228 -.338 .057
Low .253 -.357 .255 1.004* 2.729
(Medium)
Media
Exposure
High -.015 .617 .340 .530
Medium -.213 .319 -.281 -.103
(Low)
Monthly
Income
High .280 .718 .620 .424
Low .233 .158 -.541 .442
N/A: Only
Manila & 
Jakarta 
-.893 .711
(Medium)
Seoul Bangkok Manila Jakarta
Nagelkerke R Square .082 .238 .082 .090
*Significant at .015p<.055 (.05 level of confidence)
**Significant at . 005p<.015 (.01 level of confidence)
***Significant at .000p<.005 (.001 level of confidence)
Reference category is in parenthesis
Exp(B), odds ratio, is given for significant correlation
Source: SAIS-Yonsei Survey of Metropolitan Seoul (N=300); SAIS Survey of Metropolitan Bangkok (N=300), Manila (N=300), & Jakarta 
(N=310)
Note: High, Medium, and Low incomes are as follows: Seoul—High is $1151-$1750+, Medium is $551-$1150, & Low is $$0-$550; Bangkok—
High is $651-$1750+, Medium is $250-$650, & Low is $5-$249; Manila—High is $551-$1750+, Medium is $151-$550, & Low is $0-$150; & 
Jakarta—High is $151-$950+, Medium is $61-$150, & Low is $0-$60.  For Manila and Jakarta, “no answer” category was included because 113 
respondents in Manila and 120 respondents in Jakarta did not provide an answer.
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Appendix 2.
OLS Regression Analysis of Non-Electoral Participation (NEP) in Seoul, Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta
Non-Electoral Participation
Seoul Bangkok Manila Jakarta
Gender
Male (Female) .040 .018 .088 .080
Age
40 to 54 .021 -.148 -.243*** -.179**
30 to 49 .021 -.146 -.098 -.146*
(20 to 29)
Education
High .192*** .135* .139* .124*
Low -.128* -.118 -.061 -.124*
(Medium)
Media Exposure
High .083 -.008 .040 .120
Medium .123 -.015 .004 -.014
(Low)
Monthly Income
High -.015 .053 -.136* -.005
Low -.102 -.061 .035 -.171*
N/A
Manila & Jakarta 
.095 -.145
(Medium)
Seoul Bangkok Manila Jakarta
R Square .105 .094 .068 .160
*Significant at .015p<.055 (.05 level of confidence)
**Significant at . 005p<.015 (.01 level of confidence)
***Significant at .000p<.005 (.001 level of confidence)
Reference category is in parenthesis
Exp(B), odds ratio, is given for significant correlation
Source: SAIS-Yonsei Survey of Metropolitan Seoul (N=300); SAIS Survey of Metropolitan Bangkok (N=300), Manila (N=300), & Jakarta 
(N=310)
Note: High, Medium, and Low incomes are as follows: Seoul—High is $1151-$1750+, Medium is $551-$1150, & Low is $$0-$550; Bangkok—
High is $651-$1750+, Medium is $250-$650, & Low is $5-$249; Manila—High is $551-$1750+, Medium is $151-$550, & Low is $0-$150; & 
Jakarta—High is $151-$950+, Medium is $61-$150, & Low is $0-$60.  For Manila and Jakarta, “no answer” category was included because 113 
respondents in Manila and 120 respondents in Jakarta did not provide an answer.
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